Introduction
The failure of international negotiations to bridge the division between developed and developing nations (Barrett, 2005) has been a central criticism of the effectiveness of the UNFCCC process (Harris, 2007; Schiermeier, 2012; Brenton, 2013) . The large variability in economic standing, stage of development and historical greenhouse gas emissions between nations has made international consensus increasingly challenging (Helm, 2008) . The COP21 meeting in Paris represented a key turning point in the UNFCCC process; transition from a top-down to bottom-up target-setting approach through the submission of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) has been noted as a crucial factor in incorporating developing nations within mitigation commitments (Fawcett et al. 2015; Bodansky et al. 2014; Grubb, 2015) .
To date, INDCs covering 187 countries have been submitted (UNFCCC 2015b)-a clear signal of ubiquitous commitment to tackling climate change.
Despite the positive impact of the introduction of the bottom-up approach, collective
INDCs are projected to result in a global average temperature increase of around 2.7°C by 2100 (van Renssen, 2015 ;  Knutti et al. 2015) , surpassing a 2°C (or 1.5°C) threshold (Schreurs, 2015) . Two key additions to the Paris agreement -a ratchet mechanism targeting scale-up of efforts from current commitments and a five-year global stocktake of global emission pathways and projections (UNFCCC, 2015) -will prove crucial in closing this ambition gap.
It's suggested that a ratchet mechanism applied on an entirely voluntary, nonstandardised basis is unlikely to mobilise the level of global effort required to meet a 2°C post-industrial warming target. As discussions turn towards which parties should be responsible for INDC scale-up, historic divisions in the negotiating positions of developed and developing nations are likely to re-emerge. This process will be more complex due to the heterogeneous nature of proposed INDCs-the use of different metrics on the basis of absolute emission, carbon intensity, and emissions below Business-As-Usual (BAU) pathways, in addition to inconsistency in base and target years, gives no rationale for comparison of equitable burden-sharing between nations (Ji & Sha, 2015) .
To prove effective, a ratchet mechanism should: be globally all-inclusive without hindering necessary development needs (Wang et al. 2015) ; maintain a standardised approach; utilise a common emissions metric; be fair and equitable in its share of responsibility (Lange et al. 2010 ; Althor et al. 2016) ; and be flexible enough to allow to integration with emerging understanding of climate sensitivity (Meinshausen et al. 2009 ) and periodic global emissions stocktakes (Freeman et al. 2015 ; Webster et al. 2012 ).
Outlining the framework
This article presents a ratchet framework based on the principle of global convergence towards per capita equity for any given pre-defined annual emissions level or scenario. Per capita emissions were selected as a common metric to ensure (and track) a fair basis for scale-up in ambition, and as a basis of differentiation in mitigation targets-this should ensure that development needs are not compromised by reduction commitments. In contrast to negotiating individual INDCs for 187 countries, the proposed framework offers a flexible, standardised approach with only four variables: emissions start/base year; target year of convergence; target annual GHG emissions; and level of ambition.
The conceptual basis of the framework is firstly outlined, before the provision of an example case of how this has been applied to reach convergence by 2040 in line with Representative Concentration Pathway (RCP) 4.5 (IPCC, 2014a)-a pathway which represents a stepwise increase in ambition from current INDCs. It should be emphasised that RCP4.5 is used as an example only; the merit in the proposed framework is in its easy adaptation to changing internationally and scientifically agreed parameter values.
Target-setting
Targets within the framework are defined towards global convergence for per capita equity. The intended year for when these convergence targets are to be achieved introduces the first variable parameter (t)-this could be 2030, 2035, or 2040, for example, and can be determined by general consensus or stocktake review. Per capita equity level is the second variable ( e); this is set using the most robust UN population projections, and the required annual GHG emissions level for any RCP for the given target year. The required annual GHG emissions level can be set in line with any emissions scenario. This is an important degree of flexibility as it can be coupled with emerging scenario analysis (such as further IPCC reviews of 1.5°C and 2°C pathways), progressive scientific understanding and period global emissions stocktakes.
Within the framework nations are differentiated into two pools based on base year per capita emissions ( b) relative to target year equity. This base year variable is consistently applied to all parties. Pool 1 nations are defined as those with base year per capita emissions above target year per capita equity levels. In other words, Pool 1 nations would need to reduce per capita emissions by the target year if equity was to be achieved. The framework target for Pool 1 nations is to achieve an agreed percentage reduction in per capita emissions above equity levels. This percentage reduction (r) is the final variable; the same percentage reduction is applied to all Pool 1 countries. Hence, each nation's level of effort is set based on its distance from per capita equity (Equation 1):
The level of percentage reduction would have to be globally agreed, credibly reflect the level of reductions needed to achieve the agreed global carbon budget, and maintain sufficient room for Pool 2 nations to grow/peak within this budget.
Pool 2 nations are defined as those with base year per capita emissions below target year equity ( b < e). Targets for these nations are simpler: per capita emissions by the target year must not exceed equity (Equation 2): ≤ To prevent the penalisation of developing nations marginally below the per capita equity level, Pool 2 nations are not restricted from surpassing this equity threshold in the interim as long as they have peaked and reduced back to equity levels by the target year. Setting this target year restriction, however, should discourage nations from peaking far beyond equity levels, with an understanding that this will subsequently impose tougher reduction efforts. Pool 2 targets are designed as a balance between the variable development priorities that still exist, and with regard for the importance of developing nations' growth profiles in meeting a "safe" global budget.
Tracking progress
The profiles of nations' emissions within both pools will be varied. This makes it essential to outline an intended tracking mechanism to ensure nations are on-track and making sufficient progress towards the longer-term target (Knutti et al. 2015) .
Countries within Pool 1 who have already reached peak emissions ("The Reducers") would be tracked based on period-specific linear reduction profiles; nations would be expected to report annual or multi-year reduction rates relative to those necessary to reach final targets.
The second group ("The Peakers") includes nations with per capita emissions above equity and that are currently still in a period of emissions growth -making a growthpeak-reduction profile necessary to reach their respective target. In this case progress would be tracked using a metric of Rate of Growth Reduction (ROGR) percentage (%yr -1 )-the rate in reduction of GHG emissions growth required to meet its long-term target. This can be calculated based on base year per capita emissions, starting GHG growth rates, and target year per capita emission levels.
The final group of nations ("The Growers") are those with emissions below per capita. Sustainable development will be a key focus for this grouping-meeting necessary development needs while continuing to reduce the carbon intensity (CO2eGDP -1 ) of this progress. Tracking for these nations would be based on ROGR (as above) for nations expected to peak above equity, otherwise annual or multi-year carbon intensity reductions would suffice.
RCP4.5 Framework Example
To demonstrate how such a framework would function, an example iteration has been provided which falls in line with the RCP4.5 profile. The RCP4.5 scenario projects a global mean surface temperature increase of 2.4°C (likely range 1.7-3.2°C) from pre-industrial (assuming 0.6°C warming prior to the 1986-2005 reference period) (IPCC 2014a; IPCC, 2014b) . RCP4.5 has been selected as it represents a stepwise scale-up in ambition from current INDC projections (although not yet sufficient for a 2°C target).
Methods
To model this framework, a key aspect of the methodology involved a standardisation of absolute emissions and future emission targets into a per capita IPCC RCPs were converted into per capita equity pathways by dividing annual GHG emissions for each by the projected global population in every given year. RCP4.5
was selected as the framework pathway which represents a bridging stepwise increase in ambition from current INDC proposals.
Nations were split into their respective pools based on 2010 emissions relative to 2040 per capita equity (Pool 1 countries are those above target equity, and Pool 2 below). To define parameter for Pool 1 targets, its value was adjusted and resultant figures for key nations (primarily the USA on the basis of its past failure to ratify Kyoto, the EU and China) compared relative to their submitted INDCs. By finalising an value, could therefore be calcualted for all Pool 1 nations.
2040 per capita emissions for Pool 2 nations were . However, it was expected that not all Pool 2 nations will realistically reach this level of emissions given current and projected growth trends (despite being free to do so within framework targets). To balance expected emissions from Pool 1 and 2 to ensure they collectively fall below the 54.0 GtCO2e budget (with the opportunity to increase the value of if required), expected Pool 2 emissions were estimated using economic growth and carbon intensity reduction assumptions. Regional growth trends were applied to all Pool 2 nations using average regional economic growth rates derived from World Bank data 
This is in contract to other equity-based models, such as Contraction and Convergence (C&C) which aim to combine the two in a single stage (Meyer 1996) .
Firstly, it's considered important to define a distinct period of emissions convergence prior to contraction in order to distribute a fair share of effort based on current emissions inequity, and allow for necessary development needs for currently low per capita emitting nations. Secondly, especially when normalised to a per capita level, a stepwise reduction process could serve as an important engagement tool for individuals. Especially for nations with high per-capita emissions levels, defining the framework on a long-term one-stage contraction phase to comparably very low percapita levels could act as a key disincentive for short-term action. Differentiating this full process into shorter-term, more manageable target points could potentially help to facilitate wider engagement in individual footprint reduction. Thirdly, a focus on initial convergence and progress towards more equitable distribution in emissionslargely closing the developed-developing divide which currently exists-could potentially facilitate stronger global cooperation between parties. This reduction in party divisiveness could be crucial in effective mitigation in the later stages of decarbonisation when more drastic mitigation action may have to be implemented. 
Discussion

Functionality as a ratchet mechanism
The implementation of the INDC submission process has been highlighted as an important factor in reaching an inclusive agreement at the COP21 meeting in Paris (Fawcett et al. 2015; Bodansky et al. 2014; Grubb 2015) . The transition from a topdown to bottom-up target-setting approach marks an important turning point within the UNFCCC process. Its success therefore has to form an important consideration in discussions surrounding a potential ratchet mechanism, or similar policy tool. The framework proposed here aims to integrate with and build upon the success of the INDCs, rather than reverting back to a fully top-down policy framework.
The proposed framework utilises current INDC submissions; by normalising to a per capita metric, submitted targets would form base-year national emissions. The wide adoption of the COP21 agreement by UNFCCC parties suggests that the majority of members are agreeable to the share of responsibility of mitigation targets currently standing within the INDCs. This could allow for the INDCs to serve as an agreeable starting basis for any ratchet mechanism.
The proposed framework therefore serves to act as an equity-based ratchet, scaleup approach based on current, rather than historic contributions (with considerations made for future development needs). The flexibility of target year and emissions budget within the framework allows for targets to be incrementally increased through the five-year stocktake review process. The level of scale-up can therefore be tightened with each review, based on an evolving understanding of remaining carbon budgets and progress attained within the preceding target period.
The crucial component within this scale-up is its ubiquity; all parties scale INDCs in line with a globally agreed target year, budget and reduction ambition. The robustness of the proposed framework serves to eliminate potential divisions, especially in light of on-going uncertainties around precise climate sensitivity. For example, if a stage were reached whereby it was recognised that a rapid scale-up in ambition was needed to avert catastrophic climate change, divisions would likely appear between parties who had already progressed in scale-up of their INDCs, and those who had chosen to delay until later within the commitment period. How this necessary uptake of additional responsibility would be shared could lead to further breakdown in global cooperation. Periodic scale-up within a ratchet mechanism therefore needs to be handled in an inclusive, unified way to avert such future divisions.
At present there has been minimal discussion on how the proposed ratchet tool within the COP21 agreement could be managed. As the situation currently stands, INDC scale-ups are expected to occur on an entirely voluntary basis. However, considering current projections based on INDC mitigation predict a global average post-industrial temperature increase of around 2.7°C by 2100 (van Renssen 2015; Knutti et al. 2015) , a notable increase in ambition is necessary to limit global average temperature increase to 2°C. It has been widely recognised throughout the UNFCCC process, as with many collective action challenges, that the tendency to free-ride is a key barrier to effective and inclusive international action (Barrett & Stavins 2003) . It could be expected, therefore, that in an agreement where further action is entirely voluntary, nations will tend to delay or even refuse to increase target ambitions. This in turn serves as a disincentive for other parties within the agreement to do so. In this regard, it seems unlikely that the level of scale-up will be sufficient to meet collective targets to limit average temperature increase to 2°C.
The proposed framework therefore attempts to strike an important balance between the success of the bottom-up approach of the INDCs with a cooperative, equitable rationale for periodic increases in ambition.
The framework, at present, does not specify a penalty for non-compliance. It is expected that if such a framework were adopted as a ratchet mechanism, its ubiquity, in addition to its equity-based rationale, could serve as important pressures within the international community. The outlined emphasis on inclusivity, with no parties exempt from mitigation responsibilities, makes it more challenging for parties to withdraw from obligations on the grounds of unfair differentiation -such as occurred within previous agreements (Grubb 2015) .
At present, the option of trading credits within the framework has not been included. This does not rule out possible introduction of a trading flexibility, however a number of issues would have to be overcome to prove effective. One of the key aims of the framework is to simplify a target-setting process that currently has a high level of complexity, with no standardised basis for tracking or comparison. The introduction of trading permits within the framework would undoubtedly add an additional layer of complexity. A second issue could arise in the allocation of trading permits for "grower" parties-these parties do not have a prescribed level of growth, which could prove challenging in the distribution of defined credits. Finally, a number of issues have arisen from the allocation of permits within a ratchet mechanism process. If we consider the European Union's Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) as one model of a ratchet mechanism, with gradual reduction in allowances through each commitment period, we observe a number of challenges in allowance allocationthese have been widely discussed within the literature (IETA 2015; Weishaar 2007 ).
An important challenge would arise in the carry-over of emissions allowances between ratchet periods, especially in the case that carbon budgets (and therefore per capita target levels) were amended within the flexibility mechanism of the framework.
Political feasibility
Political feasibility of adoption and party acceptance, in addition to a framework's effectiveness, must form an integral part of policy analysis. Some aspects of political feasibility and how the proposed framework would operate as an agreeable ratchet mechanism have been discussed in section 5.1.There are two key components which would need to be politically considered: the somewhat top-down nature of the proposed framework, and the equity-based principle of target-setting.
In reiteration of discussion above, it is recognised that the bottom-up approach of the INDCs has been pivotal in reaching success in the COP21 Paris agreement. This has been an important transition from the former top-down approach taken within the Kyoto Protocol, and failure of agreement in Copenhagen-an approach that has proven largely ineffective and politically contentious (Bodansky 2010) . A challenging divide therefore arises: a completely voluntary bottom-up approach is unlikely to prove effective in reaching the level of ambition necessary for a 2°C target; meanwhile a top-down regime has historically been politically unpopular.
Interestingly, and in contrast with perceived support for the INDC approach, studies have shown that the least favourable principle for distributive responsibility in the climate regime has been the "voluntary principle" (Hjerpe et al. 2011 )-a result that raises further doubt in the effectiveness of an entirely voluntary ratchet mechanism.
An important consideration for the proposed framework was to therefore develop a semi-hybrid option, whereby the INDC submissions were integrated with a flexible top-down approach. A key political resistance to previous top-down approaches has been a focused pressure on a certain sub-sect of parties. Within the Kyoto Protocol, the largest contention by developed parties was the exemption of developing nations from mitigation commitments (Brenton 2013) . Moving forwards to the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen, emphasis rapidly shifted towards developing nations (most notably China, India, and Brazil)-a pressure that was perceived to be unjust, with little regard for development needs or equitable economic opportunity. In both cases, the key resistance to top-down target-setting was its exclusivity in pressure, either on developed, or on major developing nations. This led to the classic developeddeveloping divide which has been a defining barrier in previous discussions (Brenton 2013 ).
The framework presented here has been developed to attempt to overcome these divisive issues, most notably by making it all-inclusive: all parties within the UNFCCC would have defined mitigation targets, in line with current development needs and per capita contribution. Although party groupings have been discussed within the framework, these do not operate as the previous "annexe" system did within the Kyoto Protocol (Robert & Hagel 1997) ; their main purpose is to serve as an illustration of how the trajectories of parties in different stages of development may evolve within the framework targets. The other notable difference in the proposed approach from previous top-down regimes is that the target parameters within the framework would be internationally agreed and adopted within COP discussions.
Although carbon budgets would be derived and informed by the scientific community, the choice of percentage reduction above per capita equity levels, for example, would be an internationally-agreed and adopted parameter. It's likely that reaching consensus on such values could prove challenging, however, these discussions could greatly simplify COP discussions; discussions which will become increasingly complex in debating the scale-up of 180-190 unique and heterogeneous targets.
Nonetheless, the adopted targets within the framework would be based on collective ambition, rather than top-level prescription of necessary reduction targets.
Another important consideration for political feasibility is the use of an equity-based principle. The role of equity in shared responsibility has previously been a highly contentious feature of the climate regime (Caney 2009 ). However, it has been recognised that equity and fairness principles between negotiating parties can greatly enhance international cooperation. Beyond its benefits for collective agreement, equity forms a vital component of ensuring development needs can be met alongside mitigation responsibility. There have been a number of proposed equity-based principles, such as the egalitarian, sovereignty, polluter-pays, or abilityto-pay rule-each with specific preferences from different stakeholder groups (Lange et al. 2010) . Developing nations-especially the major developing economies, who have come under intense international pressure on emissions mitigation policieswould be likely to support a ratchet framework centred on the notion of per capita equity. Developed nations have historically been much more resistant to equitybased principles, most notably those with a high-degree of emphasis on historic responsibility.
Studies which have focused on the relative support and opposition to different equity-based principles have found that developed nations are significantly more supportive of egalitarian and sovereignty principles, than polluter-pays or ability-topay rules (Lange et al. 2010 ). The proposed framework implements an egalitarian (the principle of equal per capita emissions) approach-potentially the most politically feasible of all the equity principles. Political acceptance was a key consideration in selection of an egalitarian approach. Additionally, it was considered essential to develop a mechanism which standardised targets using a common, comparable metric which could be communicated effectively down to the individual level. This made a per capita based approach the most obvious choice.
While the proposed framework would inevitably face some resistance within the international community, it has been designed in such a way as to strike an important balance between the fundamental contentions which have served as a key barrier in previous discussions. The integration of both bottom-up and top-down approaches could be an important factor in ensuring that collective action is not only politically accepted, but is also effective in reaching a sufficient level of ambition. The selection of an egalitarian-based equity principle was chosen to not only to allow scope for development in low per-capita emitting countries, but also in recognition that of all the equity-based approaches, this was the least politically divisive, and most agreeable for both developed and developing nations.
Utility as a tracking tool
The framework, as outlined, has been proposed as a policy tool for adoption as a possible ratchet mechanism within international negotiations. However, it's understood that its adoption, as with any global framework, would prove challenging.
Regardless of whether it's implemented or not, it could prove useful as a key tracking tool for measurement of how fair and equitable party scale-up of INDCs are within the ratchet process.
By normalising INDC targets to a per capita basis and setting as base year emissions, the framework calculation process could be reversed; parties' percentage reductions above per capita equity could be tracked through each stocktake/ratchet period. This could serve as a key comparison for how scale-up responsibilities were shared between nations on the basis of per capita equity. This holds potential in going beyond its capacity as a tracking tool by also putting international pressure on those parties who were failing to meet their responsibilities as defined through a fair per capita metric. In this regard it could serve as a valuable tool for increasing ambition, even if not fully adopted as a keystone policy tool within the UNFCCC process.
Conclusion
Effective progress within the UNFCCC process has been hindered to date by the divisiveness between developed and developing nations-most notably controversy surrounding distribution of mitigation responsibility. This was partly bridged at the COP21 negotiations in Paris through the introduction of the INDC submission process. However, the proposed voluntary basis of the ratchet mechanism for stepup in national commitments signals a key threat to reaffirming historical divides. It's unlikely that commitments necessary for a global mitigation target of 2°C will be reached through an open, voluntary basis alone. This paper has outlined a standardised framework to the ratchet mechanism-a framework based on the principle of global convergence towards per capita equity.
As previously discussed, the modelled iteration of the outlined framework is provided only as an example of how it could be implemented. Its merit lies in its flexibility to be adjusted in line with international agreement on each of the variable parameters, and evolving scientific understanding. For example, it could offer an effective option for a standardised approach to the ratchet mechanism. In this case, submitted INDCs rerationalised on a per capita basis could serve as base year emissions, offering a standardised approach to closing the current ambition gap between 2 and 2.7°C of post-industrial warming. The necessary target year and correlated per capita equity level to achieve this could be defined based on the most up-to-date emission scenarios. The five-year stocktake review process agreed in Paris in December 2015(UNFCCC 2015a) offers the opportunity to track progress and potentially readjust on a globally consistent basis in light of emerging clarity.
